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ABSTRACT
We propose an activity-generating theory of regulation. When courts make errors, tort litigation becomes
unpredictable and as such imposes risk on firms, thereby discouraging entry, innovation, and other
socially desirable activity. When social returns to innovation are higher than private returns, it may
pay the society to generate some information ex ante about how risky firms are, and to impose safety
standards based on that information. In some situations, compliance with such standards should entirely
preempt tort liability; in others, it should merely reduce penalties. By reducing litigation risk, this type











When would a benevolent government regulate economic activity if courts both enforce con-
tracts and adjudicate tort claims? Not very often, according to standard law and economics argu-
ments. As shown by Coase (1960), so long as people whose behavior might affect each other’s
welfare can sign enforceable contracts, they will agree to efﬁcient conduct. Even if contracting is
costly, efﬁcient tort rules would generally keep harmful acts down to efﬁcient levels and restore
efﬁciency. And these rules are not too complex. For example, when harmful conduct by one party
can affect another, strict liability in many cases creates incentives for efﬁcient behavior (Becker
1968, Posner 1973, Spence 1977, Shavell 1980). There is no need for regulation. Despite this
logic, regulation is pervasive in many spheres, such as drug, workplace, or product safety, where
contracting is extensive and tort law is extremely well developed. The question is why?
Inthispaper, weproposeanactivity-generatingtheoryofregulation. Thebasicideaisthat, when
courts make errors, tort litigation becomes unpredictable and as such imposes risk on ﬁrms. This
risk can discourage ﬁrm entry, innovation, or more generally activity. In the circumstances where
social returns to activity are higher than private returns, perhaps because ﬁrms are involved in
innovative activity or perhaps because there are frictions in the labor market, it pays the society to
encourage activity by reducing litigation risks. One way to do that is to generate some information
ex ante about how risky ﬁrms are and appropriate standards for precautions they should take.
Compliance with such standards need not insulate ﬁrms from subsequent tort liability completely
if an accident occurs, but can be taken into account by courts. Following Shavell (1984a, b), we
think of such ex ante information gathering and standards for precautions as a kind of regulation.
By reducing litigation risk ﬁrms face, regulation can encourage activity and raise welfare.
Our analysis provides an analytical foundation for the commonly made argument that there is
room for regulation when litigation drives ﬁrms out of business and discourages the introduction
of new products (Viscusi 1991a, Viscusi and Moore 1993). Perhaps the closest to our analysis is
the observation by Calabresi (1970, p. 270): “Too large a ﬁne or criminal penalty in an area where
errors are likely may, as we have already seen, result in individuals abstaining from conduct we do
not wish to affect, such as driving in general, for fear that if they drive at all they may occasionally
2be incorrectly condemned and penalized.” Note that court errors are explicit in Calabresi’s quote,
and the level of activity, namely driving, is also considered. Our paper presents a formal model
in which, when law enforcers make errors, high penalties resulting from efﬁcient negligence rules
unnecessarily discourage highly socially desirable activity.
Our analysis also allows an analytical evaluation of the so-called preemption doctrine, which
holds that compliance with regulatory requirements should provide “safe harbor” against litigation
risks. The U.S. Supreme Court has struggled with this doctrine in the area of medical safety,
deciding, on subtle jurisdictional grounds, that FDA approval should preempt tort liability for
medical devices (Riegel v Medtronic) but not for drugs (Wyeth v Levine). Although several recent
articles examined the doctrine of preemption (Kessler and Vladeck, 2008, Curfman et al. 2008,
Glanz et al. 2008, Philipson et al 2009), our paper is the ﬁrst to examine the conditions under which
preemption is efﬁcient in a model of optimal social control of harmful externalities. We show
that when social beneﬁts to activity are sufﬁciently high, the optimal rule is complete safe harbor
regulation, whereby a ﬁrm that is initially found by the regulator not to need to take precautions is
exempt from damages when an accident occurs. Regulatory compliance preempts tort liability. In
contrast, if the social beneﬁts of activity are not so large, the optimal policy allows for negligence
claims even against ﬁrms that comply with regulations but the magnitude of damage awards is
lower for such ﬁrms. Regulatory compliance does not preempt liability. Under our theory, the
preemption doctrine as applied to private common law tort actions might be efﬁcient in governing
the safety of vaccines or other pharmaceuticals, but not that of airplanes.
To illustrate how the theory works, consider a simple example. Suppose that a company is
considering the construction of a nuclear power plant, and that the design can be either relatively
safe or relatively unsafe as captured by the likelihood of an accident allowing radiation to escape.
In the latter case, it is ﬁrst best efﬁcient for the company to invest in additional safety precautions;
in the former it is not. Suppose that the social beneﬁts of constructing the plant exceed the private
beneﬁts (e.g., national interest in energy independence, reduced pollution), but the plant cannot be
subsidized. Nonetheless, if unsafe designs can be perfectly identiﬁed, it is conditionally efﬁcient
to incentivize companies with such designs to take precautions: The social loss from some such
3companies avoiding costs by not building is outweighed by the gain from incentivizing those that
entertotakeprecautions. Supposeﬁnallythat, ifanaccidentoccursandradiationescapes, thecourt
determines without error whether precautions had been taken, but possibly with error whether the
design is unsafe and therefore precautions should have been taken.
In this example, without court errors, a negligence rule can achieve efﬁcient precautions by all
ﬁrms, and conditionally efﬁcient entry given the constraint that ﬁrms cannot be subsidized. With
court errors, however, a negligence regime has the unintended consequence that companies with
safe designs also face the risk that they will be held liable in the case of an accident for failure
to take precautions and, as a result, some may (inefﬁciently) choose not to operate. Regulators
have the ability to encourage entry by making an ex ante determination of whether a design is
safe or unsafe and limiting liability costs for companies with designs determined to be safe, even
if regulators also make errors. The beneﬁt of introducing such regulation depends on the degree
to which it is targeted: It limits liability costs for and only for companies with safe designs. It
also depends on the degree to which entry needs to be encouraged, an increasing function of the
shortfall of the private beneﬁts of constructing the plant from the social ones.
If introducing such regulation is welfare enhancing, should a regulatory ﬁnding that a design
is safe eliminate future liability under negligence or merely reduce the damages? If regulators
never mistakenly classify an unsafe design as safe then it is unambiguous that liability costs should
be eliminated. On the other hand, if regulators make mistakes then some companies with unsafe
designs are affected by the regulation. In this case, the answer depends on whether the construction
of nuclear plants with unsafe designs is socially beneﬁcial even when precautions are not taken.
If yes, then liability costs should still be eliminated. If no, then it is desirable to set low damages
(expected damages < cost of precautions) which deter the construction of some plants with unsafe
designs without affecting the construction of plants with safe designs.
Our paper is related to several strands of research in law and economics. Becker (1968), Cal-
abresi (1970), and Posner (1972) initiated the research on alternative methods of controlling harm-
ful behavior, and in particular on comparing regulation and litigation. Shavell (1980) and Polinsky
(1980) have considered activity levels in assessing the optimal liability rules, but not regulation.
4Immordino, Pagano, and Polo (2009) analyze the performance of different methods of controlling
harmful externalities when innovation may be discouraged. Png (1986), Kostad, Ulen, and John-
son (1990), and Polinsky and Shavell (2000) examine the implications of errors in enforcement for
optimal ﬁnes. Kaplow and Shavell (1996) provide a general analysis of the effects of accuracy in
the assessment of damages. Gennaioli and Shleifer (2008) endogenize court errors as the result of
judicial policy preferences. Essentially, the assumption of errors in law enforcement implies that
rules governing the behavior of safe ﬁrms also affect unsafe ﬁrms, and vice versa.
There is also some research on when regulation might be preferred to litigation. One previously
examined case for regulation is based on the judgment-proof problem. If, with liability, damages
might be so high that the liable ﬁrm or individual would be unable to pay them, regulation might
be optimal (Shavell 1984a,b, 1993, Summers 1983). The judgment-proof problem is particularly
applicable to small ﬁrms with limited resources. However, it is often the large corporations, with
considerable resources as well as access to insurance, that are being regulated. Another economic
argument for regulation includes the greater expertise of regulators than of judges (Landis 1938,
Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleifer 2001); our model allows some results bearing on the question of
expertise. Still another idea is that pure liability regimes are more vulnerable to persuasion and
bribery because they entail greater ex post ﬁnes (Becker and Stigler 1974, Glaeser and Shleifer
2003). In this paper, we abstract from the judgment proof problem or the incentives of law en-
forcers. Instead, our paper examines the case for regulation under three substantive assumptions:
thatthestructureofpenaltiesaffectsnotjustprecautionsbutthelevelofactivity, thatprivatereturns
to activity are lower than social returns, and that both courts and regulators make errors.
Section 2 presents the basic model of litigation and regulation. Section 3 considers outcomes
and social welfare under the efﬁcient liability regime implemented by courts alone, and demon-
strates that the activity-generating case for regulation rests on private returns to activity being lower
than social returns. Section 4 describes the circumstances under which the addition of regulation
improves resource allocation, characterizes efﬁcient regimes, and addresses the question of when
5preemption is optimal. Section 5 brieﬂy considers ﬁrm behavior under two important, but not op-
timal regimes: strict liabilty and negligence when damages are restricted to equal harm. Section 6
concludes. Before presenting the analysis, we mention two examples to keep in mind.
Example 1. Drugs
A drug company decides whether to bring a drug to market and whether to warn physicians of
a potential side-effect of taking the drug. For some drugs, the side effect is unlikely given the
information known to the drug company. For others, the side effect is likely given the information
known to the drug company.
If the enforcement method involves regulators, then prior to a drug’s release a regulator decides
whether to require the drug company to warn physicians of a potential side-effect in the process
of marketing the drug. After an accident occurs, a judge or jury decides whether or not the drug
company did and should have warned physicians of a potential side-effect. A plaintiff is awarded
damages as a function of these ﬁndings, taking into account the regulatory standard as well.
Example 2. Nuclear power
A company which is considering whether to construct a nuclear power plant decides whether
to build and whether to make additional safety investments. Given the (relatively unsafe) design
of some plants, the likelihood that radiation will escape is large and making additional safety
investments reduces that likelihood. Given the (relatively safe) design of others, the likelihood
that radiation will escape is low and making additional safety investments does not reduce that
likelihood.
If the enforcement method involves regulators, then prior to the operator’s decision of whether
to build, a regulator decides whether to require that additional safety investments be made in the
event that the plant is built. After an accident occurs, a judge or jury decides whether or not proper
safety investments were made. A plaintiff is awarded damages as a function of these ﬁndings,
taking into account the regulatory requirement as well.
62. MODEL
2.1. Setup. A ﬁrm decides whether or not to engage in an activity, y 2 f0;1g (whether to bring a
drug to market, to build a nuclear power plant). If it does not engage in activity (y = 0), it receives
a payoff of 0. If it engages in activity, it receives private gross payoff b   e, where
 b is the gross social return to ﬁrm activity, which is constant across ﬁrms, and
 e  U[0;  e] ( e < b) is a ﬁrm speciﬁc parameter that measures the shorfall of the private
gross beneﬁt of an activity from the social one. In most models of law enforcement, e = 0
for all ﬁrms ( e = 0), but here we focus on the more general, and perhaps more interesting,
case.
1
Our assumption that e  0 applies to any industry where, before taking harmful externalities
into account, ﬁrms do not fully internalize the social surplus generated by their activity. This could
be true because of positive externalities (e.g., nuclear power or R&D), asymmetric information or
moral hazard (e.g., a monopolist does not fully internalize the social surplus if it cannot completely
price discriminate; a ﬁrm faces greater private than social costs if it needs to pay efﬁciency wages),
or consumers being unable to afford to pay their valuations (e.g., hospital beds).
2
Crucially, we make the fairly standard assumption that ﬁrms cannot be subsidized, which is
important given that ﬁrms may not capture the full social beneﬁt from their activity. One way to
justify this assumption is that subsidies are costly, and the government has to raise distortionary
taxes to ﬁnance subsidies. With many competing claims on public funds, the marginal social cost
of providing subsidies could be high.
3 Another way to justify why subsidies are not given is that
they would invite a line of ﬁrms outside government ofﬁces arguing for positive externalities from
1In our model, ﬁrms vary in their ability to appropriate social beneﬁts. Another interpretation is that there is a single,
representative, ﬁrm but courts and regulators are uncertain about that ﬁrm’s ability to appropriate social beneﬁts. We
obtain similar but messier results under the alternative assumption that ﬁrms vary in the social returns from their
activity (b) and private returns equal b (0    1).
2Our model does not apply to perfectly competitive markets in the absence of market failures (even though there are
zero proﬁts), since, at the margin, ﬁrms face the private gross beneﬁt of price = marginal cost = valuation of marginal
consumer.
3A more general model could allow for subsidies conditional on a ﬁrm engaging in activity, but specify that raising 1
dollar to subsidize ﬁrms costs society (1 + ), where  > 0 represents the exogneously given shadow cost of public
funds (as in Laffont and Tirole, 1993). We do not believe that generalizing the model in this manner would lead to
qualitatively different insights, but it would complicate the analysis.
7their activity (Banerjee 1997). Firms would alter their lines of activity to seek public funds. The
government would then need to evaluate all these potential beneﬁciaries, a socially costly endeavor
especially when the government makes mistakes or is vulnerable to inappropriate inﬂuence.
Assumption 0. Transfers to ﬁrms are not possible.
If a ﬁrm engages in the activity, it also decides on its level of precautions p 2 f0;1g (whether
or not to warn physicians of a potential side-effect of taking a drug, to make additional safety
investments). Not taking precautions (p = 0) is costless. Taking precautions (p = 1) costs the ﬁrm
c and may decrease the probability of an accident. The accident imposes a social cost h, which is
assumed to be the same for all accidents.
The payoff to the ﬁrm if it engages in activity is
(b   e   cp   L); (1)
where L stands for expected liability costs given the ﬁrm’s type and its level of precautions.
The ﬁrm’s problem is to choose its level of precautions p 2 f0;1g and activity y 2 f0;1g to
maximize
(b   e   cp   L)y: (2)
The social payoff that results from a given ﬁrm choosing precautions p and activity y equals
(b   cp   H)y; (3)
where H stands for expected harm given the ﬁrm’s type and level of precautions.
For each ﬁrm, activity is a 0, 1 decision. The activity level of ﬁrms that face expected costs
cp + L if they choose to operate equals the count of the number of ﬁrms for which this cost is less
than the private beneﬁt of activity, b e. Equivalently, the activity level equals the number of ﬁrms
for which e  b   cp   L. By the assumption that e  U[0;  e], this level equals
min






8Firms differ in whether or not taking precautions is efﬁcient. Denote this aspect of the ﬁrm’s
type by , which is independent of e. Fraction  < 1 of ﬁrms are safe,  = S. For a safe ﬁrm, the
probability of an accident is independent of the level of precautions and equals S(p)  S > 0.
Hence it is socially inefﬁcient for the safe ﬁrm to take precautions.
Fraction 1  < 1 of ﬁrms are unsafe,  = U. For an unsafe ﬁrm, the probability of an accident
depends on whether or not it takes precautions. If it fails to take precautions, the probability
of an accident is U(0)  U > S. If it takes precautions, the probability of an accident is
U(1)  L
U < U.
We assume that it is socially efﬁcient for unsafe ﬁrms to take precautions conditional on engag-
ing in activity:
Assumption 1. (U   L
U)h > c.
We also assume that unsafe ﬁrms generate positive social returns to activity so long as they take
precautions (guaranteeing that it is never optimal to shut down a ﬁrm) but do not restrict whether
they generate positive returns if they fail to take precautions. Additionally, we assume that safe
ﬁrms generate positive social returns to activity.
Assumption 2. b > maxfc + L
Uh;Shg.
2.2. First best. Before introducing courts and regulators, brieﬂy consider the market failure. To
solve for the ﬁrst best, maximize social payoff (3) with respect to activity y and precautions p
for each ﬁrm. Under our assumptions, it is clear that, in the ﬁrst best, safe ﬁrms do not take
precautions, unsafe ﬁrms take precautions, and all ﬁrms engage in activity. Welfare in the ﬁrst best
is:
W
FB = (b   Sh) + (1   )(b   c   
L
Uh): (5)
2.3. Laissez-faire. In the absence of liability rules, each ﬁrm maximizes
(b   e   cp)y; (6)
9since each ﬁrm faces zero liability costs (L = 0). As a consequence, all ﬁrms engage in activity
(since  e < b by assumption) and no ﬁrm takes precautions since c > 0. Welfare under laissez-faire
is
W
LF = (b   Sh) + (1   )(b   Uh): (7)
The difference in welfare between the ﬁrst best and laissez-faire is given by W FB   W LF =
(1   )[(U   L
U)h   c], which is the social loss from unsafe ﬁrms taking inefﬁciently few
precautions (this loss is positive by Assumption 1).
Courts and regulators can help bring outcomes more in line with the ﬁrst best.
2.4. Courts. A case is brought against a ﬁrm if and only if it causes an accident.
4 If a case is
brought, the court can observe whether the ﬁrm took precautions as well as a noisy signal J of
ﬁrm safety  2 fS;Ug, where
Prob[J = ^ Sj = U;e = e
0] = SjU
Prob[J = ^ Uj = S;e = e
0] = UjS
for all e0 2 [0;  e]. Here SjU and UjS represent court errors in determining whether a ﬁrm is safe.
We assume that errors cannot be “too large” or, equivalently, that court signals are informative:
Assumption 3. 0  SjU < 1=2; 0  UjS < 1=2.
The court imposes damages D  0, where D is a function of whether the ﬁrm took precautions,
as well as available information regarding ﬁrm safety. While the court veriﬁes the ﬁrm’s type with
error, it is able to perfectly verify whether precautions had been taken (it can verify whether safety
investments were made, inspections conducted, or doctors warned).
2.5. Regulators. If the enforcement method involves regulators as well then, prior to a ﬁrm’s
choice of precautions and activity, a regulator generates a public signal R which is correlated with
4Setting the probability of a lawsuit to equal one is without loss of generality since damages are not capped. For the
same reason, we do not need to consider court injunctions to activity.
10ﬁrm safety , where
Prob[R = ^ Sj = U;e = e
0] = SjU
Prob[R = ^ Uj = S;e = e
0] = UjS
for all e0 2 [0;  e]. The public signal is interpreted as reﬂecting the regulator’s ex ante determination
of whether the ﬁrm is unsafe and should take precautions (i.e., the ﬁrm is determined to be unsafe
if and only if R = ^ U). Then SjU and UjS are regulatory errors in ﬁrm classiﬁcation. We assume
that these errors cannot be “too large” or, equivalently, that the regulatory signals are informative.
Assumption 4. 0  SjU < 1=2; 0  UjS < 1=2.
For simplicity, we assume that regulators and courts observe independent signals conditional on
a ﬁrm’s type:
Assumption 5. Prob[R = r;J = jjﬁrm’s type] = Prob[R = rjﬁrm’s type]  Prob[J =
jjﬁrm’s type] for all r = ^ S or ^ U and j = ^ S or ^ U.
The regulatory classiﬁcation can be considered by the court in setting damages. It is not im-
portant that the court (rather than the regulator) imposes a penalty in the case of an accident. It
is important, however, that the penalty can be set taking into account the regulatory classiﬁcation
together with the court’s signal.
5
Summarizing the timing of the model:
6
5A “command and control” regulatory regime is suboptimal in our model, where “command and control” here means
that a regulator may penalize a ﬁrm for failure to take precautions regardless of whether there is an accident. The
intuition is that it is desirable to make all liability costs contingent on whether accident occurs as well as the court’s
signal in order to minimize safe ﬁrms’ exposure to such costs.
6We assume that each ﬁrm faces an indirect incentive scheme D(p;R;J) in choosing its precautions p and activity
y in period 2. Our analysis would remain the same if we instead assumed that, after R is generated, society offers
a direct mechanism ft(;e;R;J);p(;e;R);y(;e;R)g and each ﬁrm decides whether to accept the mechanism
and, if so, makes an announcement of its type (^ ; ^ e), where t(^ ; ^ e;R;J)  0 represents the size of the transfer from
the ﬁrm in the event of an accident given the announcement of its type and information about its safety (analyzing
the performance of such direct revelation mechanisms in studying regulation is quite popular - e.g., Laffont and
Tirole 1993). The argument for why this would not change the analysis is simple and closely follows Fudenberg
and Tirole (1991, page 257). Suppose allocation (p(;e;R);y(;e;R)) is implementable through transfer function
11 Period 0: Each ﬁrm learns its true type (;e). The damage award function D()  0
is announced, where D = D(p;J) if the enforcement method only involves courts and
D = D(p;J;R) if the method also involves regulators.
 Period 1: If the enforcement method involves regulators, then, for each ﬁrm, the regulator
generates a public signal R which is correlated with ﬁrm safety .
 Period 2: Each ﬁrm decides whether to engage in activity (y 2 f0;1g) and whether to take
precautions (p 2 f0;1g).
 Period 3: If a ﬁrm causes an accident then the court generates a signal J which is cor-
related with ﬁrm safety  and imposes damages D in accordance with the previously an-
nounced damage award function D().
3. COURTS ALONE
We ﬁrst consider the performance of courts alone (D = D(p;J)). For any enforcement regime
involving only courts (as described by D(p;J)), each ﬁrm chooses its level of precautions and ac-
tivity to maximize (2). Denote the maximum level of social welfare achievable by an enforcement
regime only involving courts by W C.
3.1. Special case: No Positive Externalities to Firm Activity. Consider the special case where,
before taking harmful externalities into account, ﬁrms fully internalize the social surplus generated
by their activity:  e = 0. For simplicity, we refer to this case as one with no positive externalities to
ﬁrm activity.
In this special case, courts alone can implement the ﬁrst best. Consider a strict liability regime
with damages equal to harm (i.e., a ﬁrm pays h whenever it causes an accident). Under this regime,
each ﬁrm chooses precautions p and activity y to maximize
(b   e   cp   H)y = (b   cp   H)y; (8)





t if there exists (^ ; ^ e) such that t = t(^ ; ^ e;R;J);p = p(^ ; ^ e;R), and 1 = y(^ ; ^ e;R)
(if there are several such (^ ; ^ e), pick one)
 1 otherwise:
12where the equality follows from 0  e   e = 0 (recall that H stands for expected harm given the
ﬁrm’s type and level of precautions). Since the right hand side of (8) is exactly the social payoff
that results from a given ﬁrm choosing precautions p and activity y (i.e., it is equivalent to (3)), we
have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. With no positive externalities to ﬁrm activity ( e = 0), courts alone can implement
the ﬁrst best through a regime of strict liability with damages equal to harm.
Proposition 1 establishes that, absent positive externalities to ﬁrm activity, there is no role for
regulation. Strict liability with damages equal to harm ensures that precautions and activity levels
are ﬁrst best. In particular, generating additional information about ﬁrm safety cannot be helpful
in this, standard, scenario. In fact, there is no need to collect any information about ﬁrm safety to
create incentives for efﬁcient precuations without distorting activity.
7
However, there may be room for regulation when there are positive externalities to ﬁrm activity
( e > 0). Todevelopausefulnecessaryconditionforwhenregulationcanhelpinthis, moregeneral,
case, we ﬁrst establish a tighter bound on what is achievable by regimes involving both courts and
regulators.
3.2. General case.
3.2.1. Full Information Benchmark. With the enforcement regimes we consider, welfare cannot
be higher than when damages are made directly contingent on whether a ﬁrm is safe or unsafe (i.e.,
D = D(p;)) and are set to maximize social surplus. We use this full information benchmark to
assess the performance of alternative enforcement methods.
To limit the number of cases considered and to keep the problem interesting, we assume that,
absent subsidies, the net effect on social welfare of mandating that unsafe ﬁrms take precautions is






(b   c   L
Uh) > b   Uh.
7Absent positive externalities, the results of the next subsection (Subsection 3.2) imply that a properly designed neg-
ligence regime can also implement the ﬁrst best: court errors do not matter. If there is limited liability, generating
information about ﬁrm safety can help create incentives for ﬁrms to take efﬁcient precautions (e.g., Glaeser and
Shleifer 2003).
13When Assumption 6 does not hold, laissez-faire is necessarily optimal.
8
When damages can be made contingent on ﬁrm safety, it is clear that the damage schedule for
unsafe ﬁrms should be set to create incentives for these ﬁrms to take precautions (by Assumption
6) while not exposing these ﬁrms to damages when they do take precautions (by Assumption 2).
9
It is also clear that it is (weakly) optimal to never expose safe ﬁrms to damages (by Assumption 2).
Under any damage schedule satisfying these conditions, unsafe ﬁrms take precautions and engage
in activity so long as e  b   c, while safe ﬁrms do not take precautions and all engage in activity.
Welfare equals
W






(b   c   
L
Uh): (10)
Comparing this upper bound on welfare with welfare under the ﬁrst best, we have
W
FB   W








(b   c   
L
Uh); (11)
which is the loss from some unsafe ﬁrms choosing not to operate given the costs of precautions
(recall that e  U[0;  e]). If  e  b   c then this loss is zero, reﬂecting the fact that if positive
externalities are sufﬁciently low then no loss results from the inability to directly control ﬁrm
activity (or from the inability to subsidize ﬁrms).
In the remainder of the paper, we analyze and compare ﬁrm behavior under enforcement regimes
implemented by courts alone or regulators together with courts, and consider when adding regula-
tors gets closer to the full information benchmark. We maintain Assumptions 0-6 throughout the
paper, except in our statement of Proposition 5 where we relax Assumption 6.
3.2.2. Negligence. Considernegligenceregimes, inwhichdamagesarezerowheneveraﬁrmtakes
precautions or is found to be safe. As illustrated in Figure 1, any negligence regime can be de-
scribed by d  0, the level of damages a ﬁrm must pay in the case of an accident if it is found
8One simple condition that implies Assumption 6 is (U   L
U)h > 2c.




U if p = 0
0 if p = 1:
(9)
14to have not taken precautions and to be unsafe. Negligence regimes are a subset of all enforce-
ment regimes involving only courts. Denote the maximum level of social welfare achievable by a
negligence regime by W N.
  J






FIGURE 1. Damages under negligence, where damages are a function of the level
of precautions (p 2 f0;1g) and the court’s signal (J 2 f^ S; ^ Ug).
To illustrate, take the drug example. Under negligence, after an accident occurs, a judge or jury
decides both whether the drug company did and whether it should have warned physicians of a
potential side-effect. A plaintiff is awarded damages if the court decides (possibly incorrectly) that
the drug company should have warned but failed to do so.
Lemma 1. W N = W C.
By Lemma 1 we only need to consider negligence regimes to establish what is achievable
through enforcement methods that only involve courts. The intuition for why negligence regimes
are optimal is that, by using the maximal amount of information regarding a ﬁrm’s type and
whether precautions have been taken, such regimes minimize safe ﬁrms’ exposure to liability costs
(ﬁxing desired behavior on the part of unsafe ﬁrms) and eliminate unsafe ﬁrms’ exposure condi-
tional on taking precautions. We next ask when negligence, and thus courts alone, can implement
the full information benchmark. This outcome can be achieved through a negligence regime if and
only if it can be achieved when damages are the minimum necessary to create incentives for unsafe
15ﬁrms to take precautions. Label such damages  d, so:
c |{z}
cost of precautions
= U(1   SjU) d
| {z }






When d = d, a safe ﬁrm optimally chooses not to take precautions since such ﬁrms are less





expected liability cost for a safe ﬁrm if no precautions
(12)
Now we consider ﬁrm activity when d =  d. Because damages  d are such that unsafe ﬁrms take
precautions, these ﬁrms are not exposed to liability costs. As a result, a given unsafe ﬁrm engages
in activity if
b   e   c  0: (13)








which is the full information benchmark level.
Because damages d are such that safe ﬁrms do not take precautions, they are exposed to liability
costs due to court errors. As a result, a given safe ﬁrm engages in activity if
b   e   SUjSd  0: (15)








16which is the full information benchmark level if and only if
 e  b   SUjSd: (17)
We have proved the following:
Proposition 2. Courts alone can implement the full information benchmark if and only if
 e  b   SUjSd  ~ e: (18)
Proposition 2 establishes a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for courts alone to implement the
full information benchmark and there to be no room for regulation. There is no room for regulation
when inequality (18) holds, which is the condition for it to be possible for a negligence regime to
createincentivesforunsafeﬁrmstotakeprecautionswithoutdeterringsafeﬁrmsfromparticipating
in the market. In particular, courts alone can implement the full information benchmark whenever
positive externalities are sufﬁciently small or courts mistake safe ﬁrms as unsafe with sufﬁciently
low probability: Inequality (18) is satisﬁed whenever  e is sufﬁciently small (ﬁxing UjS) or UjS is
sufﬁciently small (ﬁxing  e).
To illustrate, suppose that, absent the harmful externalities controlled by the negligence rule,
the private and social returns to introducing a drug are similar. Then Proposition 2 says that there
is no welfare beneﬁt from having the FDA make an ex ante determination of whether a drug
company should issue a warning of a potential side effect. Likewise, suppose judges (or juries)
have sufﬁcient expertise that they only ﬁnd that a drug company should have warned physicians
of a potential side-effect when issuing such a warning would have in fact been socially efﬁcient.
If judges and juries really have such expertise, then there are no additional beneﬁts of regulation
either, since negligence assures correct incentives. Matters may be different if the social beneﬁts
of drug introduction greatly exceed the private ones, and judges and juries do not have sufﬁcient
expertise.
When inequality (18) does not hold, the addition of regulators may be beneﬁcial. Before turning
to this issue, it will be helpful to derive optimal damages under courts alone. When any negli-
gence regime that creates incentives for unsafe ﬁrms to take precautions deters safe ﬁrms from
17participating in the market ( e > ~ e), it may be optimal to set damages below the level that incen-
tivizes precautions ( d). If unsafe ﬁrms generate positive social returns in the absence of precautions
(b  Uh), a damage award of zero is the obvious candidate among damage awards in this range
since lowering the award encourages greater (and more efﬁcient) activity while bringing out the
same level of precautions. On the other hand, if unsafe ﬁrms generate negative social returns in
the absence of precautions (b < Uh), a damage award of zero cannot be optimal because it is
possible to set a small but positive award that efﬁciently lowers the activity level of unsafe ﬁrms
while not affecting the activity level of safe ﬁrms (recall that unsafe ﬁrms are more likely to cause
harm and be held liable if an accident occurs). The obvious candidate in this case is b  e
SUjS, which






SUjS if b < Uh
0 if b  Uh:
(19)
When  e > ~ e, damages should be set by comparing the beneﬁt of creating incentives for unsafe








(b   Sh) (20)
represent the expected gain from increasing a given safe ﬁrm’s incentive to engage in activity by












(b   Uh) (21)
represent the expected loss from eliminating a given unsafe ﬁrm’s incentive to take precautions by
reducing damages from  d to d.
Letting W(d) equal social welfare as a function of the level of damages under negligence and
deﬁning d to equal the smallest maximizer of W(d) – i.e., d = minargmaxd0 W(d) – we have
the following result:
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Proposition 3 characterizes the optimal negligence regime when positive externalities and court
errors are sufﬁciently large that negligence cannot implement the full information benchmark.
Proposition 3 says that damages should be high enough to create incentives for unsafe ﬁrms to
take precautions if and only if the proportion of safe ﬁrms () is sufﬁciently low. The intuition is
that the cost of setting large damages is the loss from detering safe ﬁrms from participating in the
market due to court errors; this loss is proportional to the number of safe ﬁrms that are affected.
4. ADDING REGULATORS
When safe ﬁrms capture an insufﬁcient amount of the social surplus generated by their activity
and courts mistake safe ﬁrms as unsafe with sufﬁciently large probability ( e > ~ e), then any negli-
gence regime that encourages unsafe ﬁrms to take precautions necessarily lowers the activity level
of safe ﬁrms. In this situation, the addition of regulators may help by reducing safe ﬁrms’ exposure
to liability costs while maintaining incentives for at least some unsafe ﬁrms to take precautions.
To illustrate most simply, ﬁrst consider the extreme case where regulators perfectly classify
ﬁrms (UjS = SjU = 0), and consider the following “safe harbor” regime involving regulators:
ﬁrms are immune from liability in the case of an accident if they are ex ante classiﬁed as being
safe by the regulator while ﬁrms are subject to a negligence claim with damages d in the case of
an accident if they are ex ante classiﬁed as unsafe by the regulator. It is clear that this combined
regime implements the full information benchmark, thus improving on the court-only outcome
when  e > ~ e.
More generally (UjS  0;SjU  0), consider enforcement methods involving courts and reg-
ulators of the following form: In the case of an accident, a ﬁrm is subject to a negligence claim,
and the magnitude of damages if found liable may depend on the regulatory classiﬁcation. As
illustrated in Figure 2, any enforcement method involving both regulators and courts of this form
19is described by (d^ S;d^ U), where d^   0 is the the level of damages a ﬁrm ex ante classiﬁed as type
^  2 f^ S; ^ Ug must pay in the case of an accident if it is found to have not taken precautions and to
be unsafe. Since we allow d^ S = d^ U, mixed regimes of this type nest pure negligence. Denote the
maximum level of social welfare achievable by such an enforcement method by W N+R.
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FIGURE 2. Damages under negligence combined with regulation, where damages
are a function of the level of precautions (p 2 f0;1g), the court’s signal (J 2
f^ S; ^ Ug), and the regulatory classiﬁcation (R 2 f^ S; ^ Ug).
To illustrate, return to the drug example. Priorto a drug’s release, a regulatordetermines whether
the drug company should warn physicians of a potential side-effect in the process of marketing the
drug. If an accident occurs, a case against the drug company is brought to court. A judge or jury
then determines whether or not the drug company did and should have warned physicians of a
potential side-effect. A plaintiff is awarded damages if the court decides (possibly incorrectly) that
the drug company should have warned but failed to do so. The magnitude of damages may depend
on the regulator’s previous classiﬁcation.
We can restrict attention to such mixed regimes by the following Lemma, where W C+R denotes
the maximum level of social welfare achievable by an enforcement regime involving both courts
and regulators. The intuition is the same as for why we can restrict attention to negligence regimes
among those that only involve courts.
Lemma 2. W C+R = W N+R.
20What is the optimal combination of (d^ S;d^ U)? Proposition 3 indicates that the optimal com-
bination will depend on the proportion of safe ﬁrms among those classiﬁed as safe and unsafe.
Let
^ S = Prob(SjR = ^ S) =
(1   UjS)
(1   UjS) + SjU(1   )
denote the fraction of safe ﬁrms among those classiﬁed by the regulator as safe and
^ U = Prob(SjR = ^ U) =
UjS
UjS + (1   SjU)(1   )
denote the fraction of safe ﬁrms among those classiﬁed by the regulator as unsafe.
Deﬁne W(d^ S;d^ U) to equal social welfare as a function of the level of damages and note that
W(d^ S;d^ U) can be expressed as Prob(R = ^ S)W^ S(d^ S) + Prob(R = ^ U)W^ U(d^ U), where W^ (d^ )
equals expected welfare conditional on a ﬁrm being classiﬁed as ^ . Finally, let d
^  equal the smallest
maximizer of W^ (d^ ); i.e., d
^  = minargmaxd0 W^ (d).
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Proposition 4 characterizes the optimal combined regime when positive externalities and court
errors are sufﬁciently large that negligence alone cannot implement the full information bench-
mark. This Proposition says that the level of damages faced by ﬁrms ex ante classiﬁed as unsafe
(safe) by the regulator should be set high enough to create incentives for unsafe ﬁrms to take
precautions if and only if the proportion of safe ﬁrms among those classiﬁed as unsafe (safe) is
sufﬁciently low.
When does the optimal combined regime in fact make use of regulators?
21Deﬁnition 1. The optimal regime includes regulation whenever d
^ S 6= d
^ U.
Corollary 1. Suppose the conditions of Proposition 4 hold. Then the optimal regime includes




> ^ U: (25)
By Corollary 1, the optimal regime includes regulation if and only if safe ﬁrms comprise a large
enough fraction of those ﬁrms ex ante classiﬁed as safe by the regulator and unsafe ﬁrms comprise
a large enough fraction of those ﬁrms classiﬁed as unsafe. In particular, regulators increase wel-
fare if and only if they are sufﬁciently good at determining whether a ﬁrm should efﬁciently take
precautions. Formally, ^ S is decreasing in regulatory errors, SjU and UjS, and tends to 1 as these
errors approach zero; ^ U is increasing in these errors and tends to 0 as these errors approach 0.
Corollary 1 thus provides some formal support for Landis’s (1938) claim that the central beneﬁt of
regulators relative to judges is greater expertise.
Corollary 2. Suppose the conditions of Proposition 4 hold.
(1) If b  Uh then whenever the optimal regime includes regulation, (d
^ S;d
^ U) = (0;  d).
Compliance with regulatory standards exempts ﬁrms from liability.








Compliance with regulatory standards reduces but does not eliminate liability.
Corollary 2 is illustrated in Figure 3 and says that when the optimal law enforcement regime
includes regulation and unsafe ﬁrms generate positive social returns even if they fail to take pre-
cautions, ﬁrms are granted immunity from future liability if they meet the safety standard set by
the regulator. On the other hand, when unsafe ﬁrms generate negative social returns if they fail to
take precautions, ﬁrms are subject to negligence claims even if they meet the standard set by the
regulator but the magnitude of damage awards is lower for ﬁrms which meet that standard.
The intuition behind these results is as follows. A pure negligence regime can always incentivize
full information benchmark precautions for all ﬁrms and full information benchmark activity for
unsafe ﬁrms. Consequently, the addition of regulators can only improve matters when the activity
22  J
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FIGURE 3. Damages under the optimal regime whenever it includes regulation.
Damages are a function of the regulatory classiﬁcation (R 2 f^ S; ^ Ug), the court’s
signal (J 2 f^ S; ^ Ug), and the social returns from ﬁrm activity (b) as compared to
expected harm generated by an unsafe ﬁrm that does not take precautions (Uh).
Everything is conditional on a ﬁrm not taking precautions (damages are identically
0 otherwise).
level of safe ﬁrms is less than the full information benchmark under negligence alone. In this
case, regulators have the ability to encourage entry by limiting liability costs for safe ﬁrms through
setting a damage award for ﬁrms classiﬁed as safe which is lower than the minimum necessary
to incentivize precautions among the unsafe ﬁrms mistakenly classiﬁed as safe. When unsafe
ﬁrms generate positive social returns in the absence of precautions, a damage award of zero is
clearly optimal among awards in this range, since lowering the award encourages greater (and
more efﬁcient) activity while bringing out the same level of precautions. On the other hand, when
unsafe ﬁrms generate negative social returns in the absence of precautions and unsafe ﬁrms are
sometimes mistakenly classiﬁed as safe, it is no longer optimal to set a damage award of zero.
This is because it is possible to set a small but positive award that efﬁciently lowers the level of
activity of unsafe ﬁrms mistakenly classiﬁed as safe, while not affecting the level of activity of
safe ﬁrms (recall that unsafe ﬁrms are more likely to cause harm and be held liable if an accident
occurs).
23Thisresultmayshedlightontheimportantpolicyquestionofwhetherregulationshouldpreempt
subsequent litigation against ﬁrms that comply with regulatory rules by providing them with safe
harbor from future negligence awards. The answer, according to our analysis, turns on whether the
social beneﬁts of activity in the particular sphere exceed expected harm from accidents even when
ﬁrms do not take proper care. For example, for medical innovations, such as vaccines, drugs, or
medical instruments, one might think that there is indeed a case for preemption, and one based on
efﬁciencyratherthanjurisdictionalgrounds. Ontheotherhand, insituationssuchasairplanesafety
maintenance, where it is difﬁcult to argue that the social beneﬁts of an activity outweigh expected
harm when proper care is not taken, our analysis provides no justiﬁcation for preemption. Rather,
the efﬁcient enforcement regime combines regulation with negligence.
4.1. Beneﬁts and Costs of Revealing Information About Firm Safety Ex ante. Regulators are
modeled as generating and revealing additional information about ﬁrm safety ex ante (prior to
a ﬁrm’s choice of precautions and activity), which allows each ﬁrm to respond to its regulatory
classiﬁcation. This is how regulation tends to work in practice. It is possible, however, that a more
efﬁcient outcome could be achieved if this information was instead revealed ex post, for example
at the time of a trial. While a formal examination of when it is optimal to reveal information ex
ante lies outside the scope of our analysis, we brieﬂy sketch the associated beneﬁts and costs.
Simplify by considering the special case where courts alone have no information available to
them (SjU = UjS = 1=2) and suppose b > Uh. There is an additional signal,  2 f^ S; ^ Ug, with
associated errors, SjU < 1=2 and UjS < 1=2. This signal can be revealed ex ante or ex post.
When  is revealed ex ante, we are in a situation equivalent to that described in Section 3: we can
conﬁne attention to enforcement methods described by dEP, where dEP is the level of damages a
ﬁrm must pay in the case of an accident if it is found to have not taken precautions and  = ^ U.






When  is revealed ex post we are in a situation analagous to that described in the previous
subsection and can conﬁne attention to enforcement methods described by (dEA
^ S ;dEA
^ U ), where dEA
^ 
24is the level of damages a ﬁrm must pay in the case of an accident if it is classiﬁed as type . The
optimal value of dEA






To limit the number of cases, conﬁne attention to regimes that incentivize at least some unsafe




;0). It is easy to verify that welfare
under  dEP is weakly greater than welfare under ( dEA;  dEA) and that (d
EA
;0) is suboptimal. Thus,
the interesting comparison is between  dEP and (0;d
EA
). The cost of (0;d
EA
) relative to  dEP is
that fewer unsafe ﬁrms take precautions: the cost of allowing ﬁrms to respond to the signal is
the loss associated with removing the incentives of measure (1   )SjU of unsafe ﬁrms to take
precautions. The beneﬁt is that it may be associated with greater activity among safe ﬁrms. To
see this, compare average expected liability costs for safe ﬁrms under  dEP to that under (0;d
EA
).














Note that (26) is larger than (27): When  is revealed ex ante, some unsafe ﬁrms know in advance
that they will certainly be held liable in the event of an accident if they fail to take precautions,
rather than only with probability (1   SjU) if  is instead revealed ex post. As a consequence,
damages can be lower by a factor of (1   SjU) while still creating incentives for those ﬁrms to
take precautions, which in turn limits average expected liability costs for safe ﬁrms. This reduction
in average expected liability costs translates into greater activity among safe ﬁrms so long as  e is
sufﬁciently large.
10
10A sufﬁcient condition for safe ﬁrms to engage in more activity under (0;d
EA
) than  dEP is for  e >
max
n








25In sum, this brief discussion suggests that revealing information ex ante – thereby allowing ﬁrms
to respond to that information – can have the beneﬁt of encouraging greater activity, and the cost
of discouraging precautions. Providing conditions for revealing information ex ante to be superior
is left for future work.
5. OTHER REGIMES
5.1. Strict Liability. Other liability regimes, in particular strict liability, cannot achieve higher
welfare than negligence in our model by Lemma 1. It is worth explaining in a bit more detail why
strict liability, whereby a ﬁrm has to pay damages whenever it causes an accident (damages are
independent of whether the ﬁrm took precautions and the signal of its type), is suboptimal.
To illustrate, consider the case where negligence with damages d =  d is optimal among neg-
ligence regimes and compare the performance of this regime to the performance of strict liability
when damages are set at dSL, where dSL is the minimum damage award necessary to incentivize












Like negligence with damages d =  d, strict liability with damages d = dSL implements ﬁrst best
precautions. However, both safe and unsafe ﬁrms face greater expected liability costs than under
negligence: Liability costs for unsafe ﬁrms are L









U . As a result, activity tends to be lower which leads to
welfare losses by Assumption 2.
11
Why does negligence perform better than strict liability under the assumptions of our model but
not under the assumptions of earlier models of optimal tort rules that incorporate activity (e.g.,
Shavell 1980, Polinsky 1980), in which strict liability with damages equal to harm always achieves
the ﬁrst best so long as only one party can affect the probability or magnitude of an accident?
12
11It can also easily be shown that strict liability with damages d cannot perform better than negligence with damages
 d for any d < dSL.
12In fact, under the assumptions of the more standard models that incorporate activity, strict liability performs better
than negligence. This is a consequence of the fact that these models assume decreasing social beneﬁts but constant
26The answer is that we relax the assumption that ﬁrms fully internalize the gross social beneﬁt of
activity (i.e., we allow  e > 0). In this case, strict liability with damages equal to harm may lead
to suboptimally low activity. When  e = 0, strict liability with damages equal to harm achieves the
ﬁrst best in our model as well, as illustrated in Subsection 3.1.
5.2. Negligence When Damages Equal Harm. Additional reasons to introduce regulation obtain
when courts adjudicating tort claims are restricted to applying a negligence standard and setting
damages equal to harm. Such damages are optimal in some circumstances (e.g., Posner 1972) and
standard in many others, perhaps because they “compensate” the plaintiff for harm and “make him
whole” (Shavell 2004).
To pursue this issue we ﬁrst need to be a bit more explicit in deﬁning what a regulator can do.
In addition to generating public information about a ﬁrm’s type ex ante, suppose regulators are
able to (i) grant ﬁrms immunity from tort liability (this decision is allowed to depend on public
information regarding a ﬁrm’s type as well as its level of precautions) and (ii) set and enforce
regulatory ﬁnes F, where the magnitude of such ﬁnes can depend on the regulatory determination
of a ﬁrm’s type as well as on whether the ﬁrm takes precautions (i.e., F = F(p;R)). We assume
that a ﬁrm needs to pay the ﬁne if and only if it causes an accident.
13 14
There are at least two additional reasons why introducing regulation may be beneﬁcial when
damages are restricted to equal harm. First, with this requirement, negligence may fail to create
incentives for ﬁrms to take ﬁrst best precautions. Introducing regulation can then result in more ef-
ﬁcient behavior even absent positive externalities from ﬁrm activity. With no positive externalities
costs from ﬁrm activity (we instead assume that ﬁrms of given safety  generate constant - across ﬁrms - net social
returns to activity conditional on a level of precautions). Combined with the assumption that, in the absence of liability
rules, ﬁrms fully internalize the social beneﬁt to activity but not the expected harm from accidents stemming from the
activity, decreasing social beneﬁts implies that ﬁrm activity may be inefﬁciently high under any regime where expected
liability costs are lower than expected harm for some ﬁrms given that they take privately optimal levels of care (as
is the case under a negligence regime where ﬁrms face zero expected liability costs so long as they take sufﬁcient
precautions to meet the standard of care).
13Equivalently, regulators only investigate whether a ﬁrm took precautions if it causes an accident. This is without
loss of generality since ﬁnes are assumed to be unbounded above (e.g., limited liability is not an issue).
14Allowing regulators to perform tasks (i) and (ii) is consistent with our earlier analysis since it is always possible to
re-write D(p;J;R) as
D(p;J;R) = e (p;R)[e F(p;R)] + (1  e (p;R))[e F(p;R) + e D(p;J;R)]
where e  2 f0;1g represents the regulatory decision of whether to grant a ﬁrm immunity from tort liability and e F 
0; e D  0 are interpreted as regulatory ﬁnes and court enforced damages, respectively.
27and damages equal to harm, safe ﬁrms could inefﬁciently take precautions if they are often mistak-
enly found liable or unsafe ﬁrms could fail to take precautions if they are often mistakenly found
not liable. With either outcome, regulation which replaces tort liability with more efﬁciently set
regulatory ﬁnes (i.e., ﬁnes that create incentives for ﬁrst best precautions) is welfare enhancing.
15
More interestingly, the requirement that courts set damages equal to harm may result in inef-
ﬁciency because the social loss from some ﬁrms avoiding exposure by stopping activity could
outweigh the gain from incentivizing those still operating to take precautions. Introducing regu-
lation that shields ﬁrms from liability can increase welfare even in the absence of court errors in
determining liability. We now develop a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for this to be the case.
Suppose courts do not make errors (UjS = SjU = 0) and that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Under
negligence with damages equal to harm, the behavior of safe ﬁrms is ﬁrst best since they are never




reduction in expected liability costs by taking precautions
(28)
and engages in activity if and only if the private beneﬁt of activity exceeds the cost of precautions:
b   e > c: (29)








While unsafe ﬁrms take ﬁrst best precautions under negligence, their activity is inefﬁciently low
whenever  e > b   c by (30). Welfare may actually be lower under negligence than it would be
under laissez faire because the welfare beneﬁt from incentivizing unsafe ﬁrms to take ﬁrst best
precautions can be outweighed by the resulting cost from a decrease in such ﬁrms’ activity.
16 The
15Under the assumption of no positive externalities from ﬁrm activity a regulatory regime in which any given ﬁrm
is ﬁned c
U if it causes an accident and failed to take precautions results in the ﬁrst best. Note, however, that strict
liability with damages equal to harm also results in efﬁcient behavior under this assumption.
















b > Uh and  e >




Examining (32) reveals that welfare is higher under laissez faire if and only if both (a) the social
beneﬁt to activity exceeds the expected value of any harmful externalities that may result when
ﬁrms take inefﬁciently few precautions and (b) the level of positive externalities is sufﬁciently
large. Since (32) is also the necessary and sufﬁcient condition for unsafe ﬁrms not to take precau-
tions under the full information benchmark, we have established the following Proposition.
17
Proposition 5. Suppose UjS = SjU = 0, Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and courts are restricted
to setting damages equal to harm. If (32) is not satisﬁed then negligence implements the full in-
formation benchmark so there is no room for regulation. On the other hand, if (32) holds then
negligence does not implement the full information benchmark and this benchmark can be imple-
mented by introducing regulation which shields all ﬁrms from negligence claims.
Proposition 5 says that when courts implement inefﬁcient precautions once the social loss from
some unsafe ﬁrms avoiding costs by not operating is taken into account, it is optimal to introduce
regulation which shields all ﬁrms from tort liability. One interpretation for why courts might
implement such inefﬁcient precautions is that, in performing the cost-beneﬁt analysis that leads to
a stringent safety standard for ﬁrms deemed to be unsafe, courts narrowly deﬁne costs: They only
consider private costs of taking precautions and ignore the social loss that will result from driving
ﬁrms out of business given industry conditions.
17As before, the full information benchmark refers to the outcome under a benevolent social planner who can set
damages contingent on a ﬁrm’s type.
296. CONCLUSION
As standard law and economics arguments teach us, private contracting and tort liability can
accomplish a great deal in controlling social harms. Finding room for socially desirable regulation
is not easy, especially for large ﬁrms that can afford to pay damages. We have tried to understand
the circumstances under which regulation might nonetheless be socially desirable. The central
assumptions of our model are the following. First, social control of externalities affects activity
levels and not just precautions. Second, aside from the adverse externalities, social returns to
activity might exceed private returns. The second assumption in particular has not been explored
in this area, even though it is plausible in some circumstances.
For this model, we have reported two principal ﬁndings. First, having regulators make an ex
ante determination of which ﬁrms should take particular precautions might be socially desirable,
even if the regulators make mistakes. The beneﬁts of regulation depend on the extent to which the
social beneﬁts of the activity exceed the private beneﬁts, and on the size of court and regulatory
errors. This implies, in particular, that the case for regulation is relatively easier to make when
regulatory institutions have expertise, and when the activities in question generate large positive
externalities, as might be the case with innovative activities.
The second ﬁnding describes the optimal regulatory rule and, speciﬁcally, addresses the question
of whether regulation should preempt subsequent tort litigation. We have found that if social
returns to activity are high enough relative to the harm from insufﬁcient precautions, it is efﬁcient
to grant ﬁrms complying with regulations safe harbor from subsequent tort liability. If social
returns to activity are not so high, it is still desirable to reduce tort liability for complying ﬁrms,
but not to eliminate it entirely.
These results may have some implications for the analysis of regulatory preemption of tort
litigation. The analysis suggests that full preemption might be desirable in situations where social
returns to the activity are particularly high relative to the harm from insufﬁcient precautions. This
might be the case, for example, with medical innovation, an area in which the US Supreme Court is
charting new territory. When the social beneﬁts of the activity are not as high relative to the social
costs of insufﬁcient precautions, full preemption is inefﬁcient. For example, it might be inefﬁcient
30to exempt airlines whose plane maintenance programs are regulated from tort liability. The paper
has suggested some ingredients of an efﬁcient regulatory regime; the optimal solution of course
depends on the circumstances of each market.
31APPENDIX A. OMITTED PROOFS








(b   cpS   Sh) + (1   )Ee[y(U;e)]
| {z }
 yU
(b   cpU   U(pU)h);
(33)
subject to
(1) pS = 1 () c  SfEJ[D(0;J)j = S]   EJ[D(1;J)j = S]g
(2) pU = 1 () c  UEJ[D(0;J)j = U]   L
UEJ[D(1;J)j = U]
(3) y(S;e) = 1 () e  b   pSc   SEJ[D(pS;J)j = S]
(4) y(U;e) = 1 () e  b   pUc   U(pU)EJ[D(pU;J)j = U].
p stands for whether precautions are taken by type  ﬁrms and y(;e) stands for whether a type
(;e) ﬁrm engages in activity.
Step 1. At the optimum, pS = 0.
Fix a solution to the problem D and suppose that D implements pS = p
S = 1. Welfare under
this schedule is given by
W
 =  y









 stands for the activity level among type  ﬁrms under D().
Now consider the alternative damage schedule D0(), with D0(0; ^ S) = D0(1; ^ S) = D0(1; ^ U) = 0
and D0(0; ^ U) = c
(1 SjU)U. Under this alternative schedule, unsafe ﬁrms take precautions and safe
ﬁrms do not. Welfare is given by
W
0 =  y
0
S(b   Sh) + (1   ) y
0
U(b   c   
L
Uh): (35)
The ﬁrst term of (35) is larger than the ﬁrst term of (34) because  y0
S   y
S and b   Sh(> 0) >
b c Sh. In addition, the second term of (35) is larger than the second term of (34). This is clear
when p
U = 1: in this case,  y0
U   y





Uh) by Assumption 2. When p




U(b Uh). But we know that the ﬁrst expression exceeds the second by Assumptions
2 and 6.
Since W 0 > W , we must have pS = 0 at the optimum.
Step 2. There is always a solution to the problem with D(0; ^ S) = 0.
Fix a solution D() and suppose that D(0; ^ S) > 0. Consider alternative schedule D0(), where
D0(0; ^ S) = 0, D0(0; ^ U) = D(0; ^ U) +
D(0;^ S)SjU




U =  y
U;p0
S = p
S = 0 (using Step 1), and  y0
S   y
S. Hence, W 0  W , implying
that D0 is also a solution to the problem.
Step 3. There is always a solution to the problem with D(0; ^ S) = D(1; ^ U) = D(1; ^ S) = 0.
Fix a solution D() with the property that D(0; ^ S) = 0. Further, assume that D(1; ^ U) > 0
or D(1; ^ S) > 0. Suppose ﬁrst that D() implements pU = 1 (so, in particular, D(0; ^ U) 
c
U(1 SjU))andconsiderthealternativescheduleD0(), whereD0(0; ^ U) = c
U(1 SjU) andD0(0; ^ S) =





U   y
U, and  y0
S   y
S.
Hence, W 0  W , implying that D0 is also a solution to the problem.
Now suppose that D() implements pU = 0. Consider the alternative schedule D0(), where
D0(1; ^ S) = D0(1; ^ U) = 0, D0(0; ^ S) = D(0; ^ S) = 0, and D0(0; ^ U) = D(0; ^ U). So long as
p0
U = p0
S = 0, it is easy to see that  y0
S =  y
S and  y0
U =  y
U, implying that W 0 = W  and
that D0() is also a solution to the problem. It is thus left to show that p0
U = p0
S = 0, or c >
U(1   SjU)D0(0; ^ U) = U(1   SjU)D(0; ^ U).
33To this end, note that, as a consequence of D() being optimal, welfare under D() must be
higher than welfare under any damage award function that implements pU = 1:
W
 = (1   )min
(
1;


































(b   c   
L
Uh) > (1   )min
(
1;








b   SUjSD(0; ^ U)
 e
)
(b   Sh) > min

1;








 e , which implies that c > U(1   SjU)D(0; ^ U).
This completes the proof of Lemma 1. The proof of Lemma 2 is essentially the same: maxi-
mizing welfare with respect to D(p;J;R) is equivalent to, for each R = ^ , setting D^ (p;J) to
maximize (33), replacing population weights (;1   ) with (^ ;1   ^ ). 
To prove Proposition 3, we will make use of the following lemma.
Lemma 3. d 2 fd;  dg
Proof. We will prove this Lemma through a sequence of claims.
Claim 1. d   d.
Proof of Claim. Clearly d  c
SUjS because it is inefﬁcient to create incentives for safe ﬁrms to









(b   Sh) + (1   )
b   c
 e
(b   c   
L
Uh):










(b   Sh) < 0;
so d = 2 ( d;1). 
Claim 2. If d <  d, then d = d.
Proof of Claim. Case 1: b  Uh.







(b   Sh) + (1   )min






 (b   Sh) + (1   )(b   Uh)
= W(0):
Case 2: b < Uh.
For d  d, we have
W(d) = (b   Sh) + (1   )min






which is constant in d for d < b  e
U(1 SjU) and increasing in d for b  e
U(1 SjU)  d < d. Thus, d  d.




(b   Sh) + (1   )
b   U(1   SjU)d
 e
(b   Uh):
By the assumption that d <  d, we have that, for all d 2 (d;  d),
W
0(d) = (1   )
U(1   SjU)
 e
(Uh   b)   
SUjS
 e
(b   Sh)  0;
implying that d = d. 

35Proof of Proposition 3. By Lemma 3, we only need to compare W( d) and W(d) to solve for d:
W( d) = 
b   SUjS  d
 e
(b   Sh) + (1   )
b   c
 e
(b   c   
L
Uh)
W(d) = (b   Sh) + (1   )min







From (37), we have that W( d) > W(d) if and only if (1   )LU > GS, or  <
LU
LU+GS. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Note that
W(d^ S;d^ U) =
X
^ 
Prob(R = ^ )[^  ySj^ (b   cpSj^    Sh) + (1   ^ ) yUj^ (b   cpUj^    U(pUj^ )h)];
where
pj^  2 argmin
p cp + (1   p)(p)Prob(J = ^ Uj)d^ 
equals precautions taken by type  ﬁrms given regulatory classiﬁcation ^  and damages d^ , and
 yj^  = min
(




equals the activity level of such ﬁrms.
Since pj^  and  yj^  depend only on d^ , W(d^ S;d^ U) can be expressed as Prob(R = ^ S)W^ S(d^ S) +
Prob(R = ^ U)W^ U(d^ U), where
W^ (d^ )  ^  ySj^ (b   cpSj^    Sh) + (1   ^ ) yUj^ (b   cpUj^    U(pUj^ )h)
equals expected welfare conditional on a ﬁrm being classiﬁed as ^ . Thus,
max
d^ S;d ^ U
W(d^ S;d^ U) = Prob(R = ^ S)max
d^ S
W^ S(d^ S) + Prob(R = ^ U)max
d ^ U
W^ U(d^ U):
But the problem of ﬁnding d^  to maximize W^ (d^ ) is the same as the problem of ﬁnding d to
maximize W(d), replacing population proportions  and 1    with proportions ^  and 1   ^ .
The result then follows from Proposition 3.

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